Ulaganje u sistem socijalne zaštite

Zakonom o socijalnoj karti, koji je usvojen u martu 2022. godine, uspostavljen je nacionalni registar za preciznije određivanje socio-ekonomskog statusa građana, a sve u cilju unapređenja socijalne zaštite u Srbiji. Kako upozorava NSG, iako je namera zakonodavca bila da se osigura pravična raspodela socijalne pomoći, u praksi se pokazalo da automatizovani procesi utvrđivanja prava na socijalnu pomoć često ostavljaju korisnike bez socijalnih davanja i potencijalno produbljuju postojeću diskriminaciju.[1] produbljuju postojeću diskriminaciju.1 Iako Srbija i dalje beleži visoku stopu apsolutnog siromaštva od 7%, uvođenje novog sistema rezultiralo je padom broja korisnika finansijske pomoći za čak 16,5% od marta 2022. do avgusta 2023. godine.[2] pomoći za čak 16,5% od marta 2022. do avgusta 2023. godine.2 Kritičari, uključujući organizaciju Inicijativa A11, osporili su ustavnost Zakona o socijalnoj karti zbog pitanja transparentnosti i zaštite podataka o ličnosti.[3] A11 i 48 poslanika podneli su zahtev za ocenu ustavnosti u julu 2023. godine Ustavnom sudu Republike Srbije, o kome još nije odlučeno.[4] [5] Izveštaj organizacije Amnesty International ukazuje na ozbiljne posledice primene Zakona o socijalnoj karti - prema njihovim podacima, oko 44.000 osoba je izgubilo pravo na finansijsku pomoć usled netačnih podataka u sistemu i preporučuje reviziju potencijalno diskriminatornih ishoda.[6] U 2022. godini zabeležen je značajan porast pružalaca usluga socijalne zaštite u Srbiji. Od 313 licenciranih pružalaca, 261 je aktivan pružalac usluge, u odnosu na samo jednog pružaoca usluge u 2013. godini. Ove usluge su bile dostupne u 93,8% opština. Dostupne usluge su pomoć u kući za starije osobe, usluge dnevnog boravka za mlade iz porodica u riziku i usluge predah smeštaja za osobe sa invaliditetom. Dostupni su i razni drugi oblici podrške, kao što su sigurne kuće i SOS telefoni za različite demografske grupe i potrebe.[7]

Rodna ravnopravnost

NSG napominje da je Srbija jedna od prvih zemalja u regionu koja je zakonski obavezala na rodno odgovorno budžetiranje Zakonom o budžetskom sistemu iz 2015. godine. Ovaj zakon je nastojao da rodnu ravnopravnost uvrsti među budžetske ciljeve.[8] Međutim, i dalje postoje izazovi u njegovoj praktičnoj primene zbog nepotpunih okvira i neizvršenih aktivnosti iz Akcionog plana za period 2022-2023. koji čini sastavni deo Strategije za rodnu ravnopravnost za period 2021-2030. godine. NSG ističe ovu Strategiju za rodnu ravnopravnost kao ključni okvir koji nastoji da se pozabavi rodnim disparitetima i unapredi društveni razvoj kroz jednaka prava i efikasno kreiranje politika.[9] Štaviše, novi Zakon o rodnoj ravnopravnosti, na snazi od juna 2024. godine, nalaže upotrebu rodno osetljivog jezika u javnoj upravi, obrazovanju i javnom informisanju. Obavezi upotrebe rodno osetljivog jezika protivili su se, između ostalih, Nacionalni prosvetni savet, Srpska pravoslavna crkva i pojedini univerziteti, koji su kao razloge navodili povredu pravila jezičkih normi.[10]

Međutim, pad Srbije sa 23. na 38. mesto na Globalnom indeksu rodnog jaza Svetskog ekonomskog foruma (WEF) ozbiljan je signal da uprkos pozitivnim pomacima na području rodno odgovornog budžetiranja, još uvek postoje značajni izazovi u ostvarivanju pune rodne ravnopravnosti.[11] Regionalne studije ističu da se žene u Srbiji suočavaju sa značajnim preprekama na tržištu rada, kao što su diskriminacija i neusklađenost između obrazovanja i zahteva tržišta rada.[12] Izmenama i dopunama Zakona o finansijskoj podršci porodici sa decom, koje su stupile na snagu u avgustu 2023. godine, produženo je porodiljsko odsustvo za treće i svako naredno dete, ali su preduzetnice i žene na fleksibilnim ugovorima ostale u nepovoljnom položaju.[13] Femicid i dalje predstavlja ozbiljan problem u Srbiji, budući da izveštaji organizacija civilnog društva ukazuju na visoku stopu femicida.[14] Kritičari ističu da su podaci o nasilju nad ženama, posebno u marginalizovanim grupama, kao što su LGBTQI+ osobe, izbeglice i žene u prostituciji, često nepotpuni i neadekvatni da predstave njegov obim, a pozivi da se femicid definiše kao posebno krivično delo i da se poboljša zaštita do sada nisu naišli na odgovor.[15]

Dobra praksa

The Government of Serbia’s Coordinating Body for Gender Equality,

u saradnji sa Agencijom UN Women, a uz finansijsku podršku EU, odabralo u okviru projekta Ključni koraci ka rodnoj ravnopravnosti u Srbiji, faza 2, devet lokalnih samouprava koje su prepoznale značaj unapređenja rodne ravnopravnosti i ponudilo im podršku da izrade nove Lokalne akcione planove za rodnu ravnopravnost i realizuju jednu ili više aktivnosti iz usvojenih planova. Uz ovaj vid podrške, lokalne samouprave i mehanizmi za rodnu ravnopravnost će doprineti unapređenju rodne ravnopravnosti i poboljšanju položaja žena u svojim zajednicama. [16]

Obrazovanje, obuka i doživotno učenje

Serbia’s education, training, and lifelong learning sectors encountered significant challenges over the last year, despite continuous reform efforts aimed at improvement. Serbia’s education reforms have focused on improving education quality, teacher training, and infrastructure, with an emphasis on inclusivity. Specific programmes have supported Roma children with scholarships and mentorship to reduce dropout rates and enhance academic outcomes. However, there are significant regional disparities in educational access and quality, the NSG reports. Urban areas benefit from more schools and better resources, while rural areas struggle with fewer schools and limited opportunities for teachers to develop.[17] Shodno tome, učenici u urbanim sredinama ostvaruju značajno bolje rezultate na standardizovanim testovima u odnosu na svoje vršnjake iz ruralnih područja.

Improving teacher training and professional development remains a critical challenge in Serbia, as many teachers lack access to essential continuous professional development opportunities. Programmes such as the Teacher Training Academy aim to enhance pedagogical skills through workshops and training sessions, but their effectiveness is limited by insufficient funding and logistical challenges. There are also challenges in integrating digital tools into Serbian education, which hinder students’ acquisition of digital literacy. Many schools lack adequate resources, and teachers need more training to use the technologies effectively.[18] Serbia’s Vocational Education and Training (VET) system struggles to align the skills it teaches to job market demands, resulting in high unemployment rates among graduates. Its dual education programmes seek to address this, but their early-stage implementation requires significant investment and collaboration with industry.[19] Amendments to the Dual Education Act, effective from September 2023, aim to improve Serbia’s dual education model through stakeholder collaboration. Changes include a new Learning through Work Programme, increased workplace learning hours, fixed remuneration for work-based learning, and the introduction of training alliances and centres.[20] NSG upozorava da, uprkos naporima da se unapredi doživotno učenje i obrazovanje odraslih, stope učešća i dalje ostaju niske zbog nedostatka svesti, finansijskih i vremenskih ograničenja.

Uključivanje migranata, izbeglica, tražilaca azila i manjina

In July 2023, Serbia’s National Assembly amended the Asylum Act and the Act on the Employment of Foreigners to improve refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to rights, facilitate foreign nationals’ employment, and align with EU standards on migration. The revised Foreigners Act now allows asylees residing continuously in Serbia for over three years to apply for permanent residence under less stringent conditions. These revisions significantly improve labour market access for refugees, asylum seekers, and those with subsidiary and temporary protection, including victims of human trafficking, the NSG notes. However, refugees and asylum seekers face significant challenges in accessing housing, education, healthcare, and employment due to inadequate resources and support services. Lengthy asylum procedures and a backlog of cases add to their uncertainty, while discrimination and xenophobia hinder integration, which has an impact on asylum seekers’ mental health and social connections. To promote economic independence and social integration, targeted programmes are needed for language learning, vocational training, cultural orientation, and psychosocial support.

U martu 2023. godine, privremena zaštita raseljenih lica iz Ukrajine produžena je do marta 2024. godine.[21] U periodu od januara do juna 2023. Kancelarija za azil je odobrila privremenu zaštitu za 198 podnosilaca zahteva, uglavnom iz Rusije, Jermenije, Libije, Gruzije i Litvanije.[22] Ovi korisnici su odmah dobili pristup tržištu rada, a u nekim slučajevima su smanjene naknade za radnu dozvolu. Srbija je i 2023. godine nastavila da se suočava sa izazovima u integraciji romskih zajednica, uprkos inicijativama kao što su Nacionalna strategija za socijalno uključivanje Roma i usklađivanje sa strateškim okvirom EU za Rome (2020-2030). Ovi napori su usmereni na stanovanje, obrazovanje, zapošljavanje i zdravstvenu zaštitu u cilju prevazilaženja anticiganizma i promovisanja socio-ekonomske integracije. Međutim, Romi, posebno žene, devojke i interno raseljena lica, i dalje se suočavaju sa marginalizacijom i diskriminacijom, što im ograničava pristup obrazovanju, poslovima i javnim uslugama. Pored toga, Srbija ima poteškoća sa obezbeđivanjem jednakih prava za osobe sa invaliditetom, usled problema kao što su oblici višestruke diskriminacije, nedostatak univerzalnog dizajna u javnim prostorima i prepreke inkluzivnom obrazovanju i zapošljavanju. U ustanovama socijalne zaštite i dalje postoji zabrinutost zbog poslovne sposobnosti lica sa intelektualnim invaliditetom. U toku su napori da se izmene standardi akreditacije kako bi visoko obrazovanje postalo inkluzivnije, ali neophodno je još poboljšanja za bolji pristup uslugama i rešavanje povreda prava pri zapošljavanju.[23] NSG kao pozitivan razvoj ističe Strategiju deinstitucionalizacije i razvoja usluga socijalne zaštite u zajednici za period 2022–2026. godine. Ova strategija ima za cilj da promoviše socijalnu inkluziju i spreči nepotrebnu institucionalizaciju (prvenstveno lica sa intelektualnim i mentalnim invaliditetom). Pokrenuto je usvajanje akcionog plana za period 2023–2024. godine za implementaciju Strategije deinstitucionalizacije i razvoja usluga socijalne zaštite u zajednici za period 2022–2026. godine, ali do kraja izveštajnog perioda Stretegija još uvek nije usvojena.

Nezaposlenost mladih

Stope zaposlenosti i učešća mladih su u periodu od 2015. do 2019. godine porasle, dok je stopa nezaposlenosti opala, prema Strategiji zapošljavanja za period 2021–2026. godine, koja ima za cilj poboljšanje uključivanja mladih na tržište rada.[24] Prema podacima Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje, u Srbiji je stopa nezaposlenosti mladih, posebno lica između 25 do 29 godina starosti, opala tokom protekle decenije usled faktora kao što su emigracija i bolje obrazovanje.[25]

Strategija zapošljavanja za period 2021–2026. godine usmerena je na bavljenje pitanjima zapošljavanja mladih kroz program Garancija za mlade kojim bi se osobama mlađim od 25 godina obezbedio posao, obrazovanje, praksa ili pripravnički staž u roku od četiri meseca od gubitka posla ili završetka obrazovanja. Ovo Srbiju dovodi u skladu sa standardima EU, a u regionima sa ograničenim mogućnostima garancija je proširena na osobe do 29 godina.[26] regionima sa ograničenim mogućnostima garancija je proširena na osobe do 29 godina.26 Vlada uvodi Garanciju za mlade od 2024. godine i uključuje pilot programe koji su fokusirani na mlade i marginalizovane grupe kao što su žene, osobe sa invaliditetom i dugotrajno nezaposleni.[27]

Inicijativa Moja prva plata pokrenuta je u okviru Vladine uredbe o programu podsticanja zapošljavanja mladih i od 2020. godine značajno je podstakla zapošljivost mladih. Program, kojim su povećane stope zarada 2023. godine i koji je dobio pohvalu od Evropske komisije[28], ima za cilj da 10.000 mladih odraslih integriše u radnu snagu subvencionisanjem njihovih plata i pružanjem mentorstva.[29] The National Youth Council of Serbia’s 2023 Alternative Report underscores the struggles of youth in finding secure employment and their inclination to seek better opportunities abroad due to dissatisfaction with the availability of contract-based jobs. Many face precarious conditions without formal employment, and they lack social security and adequate living standards. The 2021–2026 Employment Strategy[30] prepoznaje sve veću zastupljenost fleksibilnih oblika rada i zalaže se za preispitivanje zakonske regulative kako bi se radna i socijalna prava zaštitila od proizvoljnih tumačenja istih od strane poslodavaca. Takvo preispitivanje će zahtevati koordinisane napore između vlade, poslodavaca i zagovornika mladih.

[1] A11 Initiative (2022), Anti-Social Cards: https://www.a11initiative.org/en/antisocial-cards/

[2] A11 (2022), We explain (some) myths about the Social Card: https://www.a11initiative.org/objasnjavamo-neke-mitove-o-socijalnoj-karti/

[3] A11 (2022), The Initiative for the Constitutional Review of the Law on Social Card has been submitted: https://www.a11initiative.org/en/the-initiative-for-the-constitutional-review-of-the-law-on-social-card-has-been-submitted/

[4] A11 (2022), Support grows for A 11 constitutional challenge to the Social Cards Law: https://www.a11initiative.org/en/support-grows-for-a-11-constitutional-challenge-to-the-social-cards-law/

[5] Ne davimo Beograd (Don’t Let BelgradeD(r)own) (2023)We are seeking a constitutional review of the Social Card Act (25.07.2023) https://nedavimobeograd.rs/dordevic-trazimo-ocenu-ustavnosti-zakona-o-socijalnoj-karti/

[6] Amnesty International (2023), Serbia – Trapped by automation: Poverty and discrimination in Serbia’s welfare state: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/12/trapped-by-automation-poverty-and-discrimination-in-serbias-welfare-state/

[7] Republic Institute for Social Protection (2023), Report on Social Welfare Services at the Local Level Provided by Licensed Service Providers in 2022: https://www.zavodsz.gov.rs/media/2638/izvestaj-o-uslugama-socijalne-zastite-na-lokalnom-nivou-koje-pruzaju-licencirani-pruzaoci-usluga-u-2022.pdf

[8] Gender-responsive budgeting refers to a way of planning and spending money that ensures both men and women benefit equally.

[9] SAI (2023), Report on the Audit of Business Expediency – Establishing Gender Responsive Budgeting in the Republic of Serbia: https://www.dri.rs/storage/newaudits/2023-2-SV%20Uspostavljanje%20rodno%20odgovornog%20budzetiranja%20u%20RS.pdf

[10] Biznis  (2023), Will entrepreneurial moms be equated with employed women in 2023: https://biznis.rs/vesti/srbija/da-li-ce-mame-preduzetnice-u-2023-biti-izjednacene-sa-zaposlenim-zenama/

[11] World Economic Forum (2023), Global Gender Gap Report 2023: https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/

[12] BFPE (2022), Economic (Non)Power of Women in the Labor Market in the Western Balkans, Democracy for Development: https://en.bfpe.org/analysis-and-publications/economic-non-power-of-women-in-the-labor-market-in-the-western-balkans/

[13] Mom’s rule (2023), Five years of fighting for women, children, youth, and families:  https://www.mamesuzakon.org/pet-godina-borbe-za-zene-decu-mlade-i-porodice/

[14] Femplatz (2023), Report on women’s rights and gender equality in Serbia for 2023, p.101: https://femplatz.org/library/reports/2024-03-19_PreneraZena_2023_SR.pdf

[15] RFE (2023), Protest against femicide in Belgrade: “No more women”: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/protest-protiv-femicida-u-beogradu-nijedna-zenavise/32287071.html

[16] Pravni portal (2023), Article Advancing gender equality at the local level, https://www.pravniportal.com/unapredenje-rodne-ravnopravnosti-na-lokalu/

[17] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2024), Education: https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-US/oblasti/obrazovanje

[18] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2024), Education: https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-US/oblasti/obrazovanje

[19] Delegation of the European Union in the Republic of Serbia (2013), Second chance program: https://europa.rs/druga-sansa-za-bolju-buducnost/

[20] Official Gazette of RS No. 76/2023 (2023) Law on Amendments to the Law on Dual Education: https://www.paragraf.rs/izmene_i_dopune/070923-zakon-o-izmenama-i-dopunama-zakona-o-dualnom-obrazovanju.html

[21] Official Gazette of the RS No. 21/2023-44 (2023), Decision Amending the Decision on the Provision of Temporary Protection in the Republic of Serbia to Persons Displaced from Ukraine: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/odluka-o-pruzanju-privremene-zastite-raseljenim-licima-koja-dolaze-iz-ukrajine.html

[22] Belgrade Center for Human Rights (2023), Right to asylum in the Republic of Serbia, Report for January -June 2023: https://azil.rs/azil_novi/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Pravo-na-azil-u-Republici-Srbiji-Izvestaj-za-period-januar-jun-2023.pdf

[23] Protector of Citizens (2023), Regular Annual Report of the Protector of Citizens for 2022: https://www.ombudsman.org.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=739:the-protector-of-citizens-submitted-the-regular-annual-report-for-2022-to-the-national-assembly&catid=44&Itemid=4

[24]  Government of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs (2021), Employment Strategy of the Republic of Serbia 2021-2026, (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No.18/21 and 36/21 -correction):  http://demo.paragraf.rs/demo/combined/Old/t/t2021_03/SG_018_2021_003.htm

[25] Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (2023), Report following her visit to Serbia from 13 to 17 March: https://rm.coe.int/report-on-serbia-by-dunjamijatovic-commissioner-for-human-rights-of-t/1680ac88cc

[26]KOMS(2022), Youth Guarantees: Experience and Opportunities: https://koms.rs/2022/04/garancije-za-mlade-iskustvo-i-mogucnosti/

[27] KOMS (2023), Alternative Report on the Status and Needs of Youth in the Republic of Serbia for 2023: https://koms.rs/publications/

[28] European Commission (2023) Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

[29] Mario Reljanović’s, Peščanik  (2020), My first salary: https://pescanik.net/moja-prva-nadnica/

[30] Government of the Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veterans and Social Affairs (2021) Employment Strategy of the Republic of Serbia 2021-2026: https://socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Strategija_zaposljavanja_u_Republici_Srbiji_2021-2026_engleski.pdf

Adekvatne plate

The annual minimum wage threshold – the lowest hourly rate that can be legally paid to workers – has grown significantly in recent years. This is determined by the Social and Economic Council.[1] Minimalna zarada se promenila 2023. godine u odnosu na 2022. godinu, a bruto i neto prosečne zarade su značajno porasle.[2] Najveće neto plate bile su u sektorima kao što su IT, naučno istraživanje, proizvodnja nafte i finansijske usluge. Povećanje plata posebno je bilo primetno u regionima poput Beograda, gde su prosečne zarade bile najviše i iznosile 106.746 dinara. Ovo ukazuje na jaču ekonomsku aktivnost i potencijalno veću potražnju za kvalifikovanom radnom snagom u Beogradu nego u regionima sa nižim platama, poput Šumadije i Zapadne Srbije, gde je prosečna zarada iznosila 70.165 dinara.[3]

In September 2023, Serbia’s government raised the minimum wage from 230 to 271 RSD per hour. Despite trade unions’ push for a higher increase to match the rise in price of the minimum consumer basket, their proposals were rejected, amid ongoing tensions over wage adequacy as costs and consumer prices rise.[4] [5] Žene u Srbiji se i dalje suočavaju sa značajnim platnim jazom: u proseku zarađuju 20% manje od muškaraca, uprkos čak i višem stepenu obrazovanja.[6] stepenu obrazovanja.36 Ovaj disparitet i dalje postoji, iako je zakonska zaštita od nejednakih plata predviđena članom 34. Zakona o rodnoj ravnopravnosti. Romkinje, žene sa invaliditetom i žene koje žive u ruralnim područjima susreću se sa posebno izraženim ekonomskim izazovima. Romkinje mlađe od 18 godina često rano stupaju u brak, što im ograničava pristup obrazovanju i mogućnostima za zaposlenje.[7] Žene koje žive u ruralnim oblastima, uprkos ogromnom radu koji svakodnevno obavljaju u domaćinstvu, često nemaju vlastitu imovinu ili priliku da se formalno zaposle.[8]

Sigurnost posla

U drugom kvartalu 2024. godine ukupan broj zaposlenih iznosio je 2.367.170. Ukupan rast registrovane zaposlenosti u odnosu na isti kvartal prethodne godine je 0,1%.[9] U istom periodu broj nezaposlenih iznosio je 257.800, dok je broj stanovnika van radne snage bio 2.484.400.[10] Kao pozitivan razvoj ističe se Program dostojanstvenog rada za period 2019-2022. godine [11], koji ima za cilj da odgovori na izazove kao što su visoka nezaposlenost mladih, rodne razlike, neformalna zaposlenost i rizik od siromaštva. Program utvrđuje prioritete kao što su ažuriranje Zakona o radu, poboljšanje rešavanja radnih sporova, jačanje radničkih organizacija, sprovođenje nacionalne strategije zapošljavanja i poboljšanje uslova rada.

However, the lack of a universal legal framework outlining regulations for decent work is concerning, the NSG notes, as the Labour Act only partially regulates decent work. The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) definition of decent work includes fair wages, job security, social protection, personal growth, and equal opportunities.[12]  The ILO’s Decent Work Agenda focuses on increasing employment, promoting workers’ rights, enhancing social protection, and fostering social dialogue. Serbia is lagging behind in these areas.[13] Nedostatak dostojanstvenog rada u Srbiji evidentan je u zanemarivanju formule 8-8-8 (za sate rada, odmora i slobodne aktivnosti). Prema izveštaju FairWork 2023, situacija je nepovoljnija za atipične oblike zaposlenja[14] U izveštaju se navodi da platforme kao što su Glovo, Wolt, Mr. D i Yandex uglavnom ne obezbeđuju dostojanstven rad i da radnici koji rade preko ovih platformi često zarađuju ispod zarade za pristojan život i suočavaju se sa opasnim radom i nesigurnošću posla.[15] Srpski sindikati i OCD [16] lobbied for labour law reforms by 2024 to improve working conditions and workers’ wellbeing. Their Workers Proclamation called for better regulation of employment relationships, the eradication of poverty, fair wealth distribution, dignity at work, and the abolition of Sunday work (except for essential services). They also urged enhanced roles for the Social and Economic Council, better protection of individual and collective rights, fair collective bargaining, and improved oversight through labour courts and inspectors.[17]

Bezbednost i zdravlje na radu

Serbia made significant strides in Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) in 2023, by ratifying international conventions such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) and ILO Conventions No. 187 and No. 167. It also adopted a comprehensive new OHSA law, which introduced stricter regulations, including mandatory education for OHS advisors, licensing for OHS professionals, and measures for remote workers. However, Serbia’s Labour Inspectorate, with only 214 inspectors for over 400,000 entities, needs greater resources and staff numbers to enforce these new standards effectively.[18] In Serbia, the Labour Act provides crucial protections for workers under 18, parents, and people with disabilities or health issues. The Act also strictly prohibits the termination of female workers’ employment during pregnancy or maternity leave and emphasizes employers’ obligations to support breastfeeding breaks (Arts. 89–93).[19] i naglašava obavezu poslodavaca da uvedu pauze za dojenje (čl. 89–93).49 Po Zakonu o radu u Srbiji, osoba se smatra punoletnom sa 18 godina, ali je dozvoljeno zapošljavanje lica starijih od 15 godina, pri čemu mlade osobe mlađe od 18 godina ne smeju obavljati opasne poslove. Zakon takođe nalaže da zaposleni kojima je dijagnostikovan zdravstveni problem budu raspoređeni na odgovarajuće radno mesto ili da dobiju otpremninu ako preraspoređivanje nije moguće.

Socijalna i solidarna ekonomija

In 2023, Serbia’s social and solidarity economy (SSE) grew thanks to the work of cooperatives, social enterprises, and mutual aid societies focused on sustainability. Despite support from the Social Entrepreneurship Act, progress was hindered by delays in implementing necessary regulations. By year-end, about 50 social enterprises had been recognised of an estimated 1,200 awaiting recognition, highlighting challenges in fully developing the sector. This growth is enhancing the economy and social landscape by creating jobs, supporting marginalised groups, and addressing local needs through sustainable practices. The Coalition for Solidarity Economy Development (CoSED) has been a pivotal force in Serbia’s social economy, driving legislative advances such as the Law on Social Entrepreneurship. It also provides crucial capacity-building through training and resources for social entrepreneurs, while forging partnerships with financial institutions to offer access to finance through social-impact bonds and microfinance programmes.

Socijalna i solidarna ekonomija suočava se sa izazovima regulatorne nesigurnosti i ograničenog pristupa finansijama. Da bi se prevazišli ovi izazovi, potrebne su sveobuhvatne politike i inovativna rešenja za finansiranje. Jačanje kapaciteta i podizanje svesti javnosti su od vitalnog značaja za podršku menadžmentu preduzeća i širenju sektora. Uprkos značajnim finansijskim izdvajanjima od 135 miliona dinara za razvojne inicijative SSE, udruženja građana su isključena iz ekonomskih konkursa i suočavaju se sa preprekama prilikom registracije za više privrednih delatnosti. Zainteresovane strane preporučuju prilagođene konkurse, obrazovne programe za zvaničnike i poboljšane politike usmerene na sistematsku podršku rastu socijalnih preduzeća u Srbiji.[21]

Dobra praksa

Projekat WISEs4Youth ima za cilj da unapredi veštine socijalnog preduzetništva među mladim ljudima na Zapadnom Balkanu kroz aktivnosti obuke i mobilnosti. U okviru ove inicijative, grupa mladih potencijalnih socijalnih preduzetnika posetila je preduzeća za profesionalnu rehabilitaciju u Albaniji, Srbiji, Hrvatskoj, Severnoj Makedoniji i Sloveniji. Partneri na projektu su odabrali ova preduzeća da prikažu uspešne modele socijalnog poslovanja, ističući njihovu raznolikost i pozitivan društveni uticaj.[22] [23] [24]

Ravnoteža između poslovnog i privatnog života

Srbija je, ratifikacijom većine konvencija MOR-a o nedeljnom odmoru i plaćenom odsustvu, pokazala svoju posvećenost međunarodnim standardima rada. Međutim, iz određenih kontekstualnih razloga, Srbija je odlučila da istupi iz nekih konvencija, kao i da neke ne ratifikuje. Zakon o radu[25] in Serbia limits the standard workweek to 40 hours and restricts overtime to an additional eight hours per week. This framework ensures a work-life balance and includes breaks and rest periods to maintain workers’ health and productivity. The Labour Act mandates a minimum 12-hour rest period within any 24-hour period and a paid weekly rest period of 24 hours, usually on Sunday, though this can also be taken on another day.

Ove odredbe odražavaju posvećenost Srbije promovisanju zdrave ravnoteže između poslovnog i privatnog života i usklađivanju sa evropskim standardima rada, napominje NSG. Međutim, selektivnom ratifikacijom konvencija Srbija pokazuje svoju nespremnost da se u potpunosti uskladi sa međunarodnim standardima.

Socijalni dijalog

Evropska komisija u svom Izveštaju za Srbiju za 2023. godinu zaključuje da je socijalni dijalog u Srbiji i dalje slab, posebno u pogledu uključivanja socijalnih partnera u kreiranje odgovarajućih politika.[26] Social dialogue faced several challenges in Serbia. Representation is a prominent problem and comes in the form of fragmented trade unions, difficulties for employers’ associations in addressing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and limited unified bargaining power. Another challenge is the lack of influence social dialogue has on broader economic policies. For instance, economic austerity measures lacked adequate consultation with social partners, while the large informal economy narrows the reach of formal social dialogue mechanisms, leaving many workers uncovered by formal negotiations. The implementation and enforcement of agreements were inconsistent, and emerging issues such as remote work highlighted the need for adaptive frameworks to address evolving labour market trends.

In 2023, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern over Serbia’s restrictive provisions on the right to strike under the current Strike Act, and it urged revisions to better align with international standards.[27] Radnici su izrazili svoje nezadovoljstvo u više štrajkova.[28] [29] [30] [31] [32] Savetnica ministra rada je navodno ometala štrajk u kragujevačkom preduzeću Energetika, preteći predstavnicima sindikata da odustanu od štrajka.[33] Neki sindikati su nakon štrajkova postigli sporazume sa vladom, ali su drugi nastavili sporove.[34] [35] [36] [37]

[1] Social and Economic Council of the Republic of Serbia (2024), Minimum wage: http://www.socijalnoekonomskisavet.rs/eng/minimalna%20zarada%20eng.htm

[2] World Economic Forum (2023), Global Gender Gap Report 2023: https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-gender-gap-report-2023/

[3] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2023) Notification under the number 4.  Average salaries per employed, municipalities and cities:

https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2023/HtmlL/G20231319.html

[4] Danas (2023), There is no agreement, the minimum in the future will be as determined by the Government of Serbia – the trade unionists are considering the next steps: https://www.danas.rs/vesti/ekonomija/vlada-srbijesindikalci-minimalac-dogovor/

[5] Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Trade (2023), Purchasing power of the population, consumer basket: https://must.gov.rs/tekst/sr/378/potrosacka-korpa.php

[6] Biznis (2022), Women over 45 have a harder time finding jobs and are more often laid off: https://biznis.rs/preduzetnik/zene-starije-od-45-godina-teze-dolaze-do-posla-i-cesce-dobijaju-otkaz/

[7] Biznis (2022), Women over 45 have a harder time finding jobs and are more often laid off: https://biznis.rs/preduzetnik/zene-starije-od-45-godina-teze-dolaze-do-posla-i-cesce-dobijaju-otkaz/

[8] NALED (2022), More than 90% of women in the countryside own no land whatsoever/ https://naled.rs/en/vest-vise-od-90-zena-na-selu-nema-ni-metar-zemljista-u-svom-vlasnistvu-7195

[9] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2024) Registered employment in Serbia, (II quartal 2024) https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/vesti/statisticalrelease/?p=15226&a=24&s=2402?s=2402

[10] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2024) Labour Force Survey (II quartal) https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/vesti/statisticalrelease/?p=15270&a=24&s=2400?s=2400

[11] M. Reljanović, S. Bradaš (2019), Indicators of Decent Work in Serbia – Analysis of the Normative Framework and Practice: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/belgrad/15771.pdf

[12] ILO (1999), Report of the Director-General: Decent Work in Proceedings of the International Labour Conference, 87 Session: https://webapps.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/rep-i.htm

[13] Sarita Bradas (2017) Statistics and Decent Work – A Critical Analysis of the Political Interpretation of Labor Statistics:  http://www.centaronline.org/userfiles/files/publikacije/fcd-analiza-statistika-i-dostojanstven-rad.pdf

[14] Fairwork and Public Policy Research Centre (2023), Fairwork Serbia Ratings 2023: https://fair.work/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2023/09/Fairwork-Serbia-Ratings-2023-EN-FNAL.pdf

[15]   Fairwork and Public Policy Research Centre (2023), Fairwork Serbia Ratings 2023: https://fair.work/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/2023/09/Fairwork-Serbia-Ratings-2023-EN-FNAL.pdf

[16] The Association of Autonomous Vojvodina Trade Unions, Alliance of Autonomous Novi Sad City and Municipal Trade Unions, the United Trade Unions of Serbia “Sloga”, Centre for Dignified Work, Zrenjanin Social Forum, Kragujevac “Nova svetlost” Association, A11– Initiative for Economic and Social Rights, Centre for the Politics of Emancipation, Centre for Democracy Foundation and the Centre for Modern Skills.

[17] Centre for Democracy Foundation  (2023), Commit yourself! – Workers’ proclamation 2023:  http://www.centaronline.org/sr/dogadjaj/12951/obavezite-se-radnicki-proglas-2023

[18] MLEVSI (2023), Report on the Work of the Labour Inspectorate: https://www.minrzs.gov.rs/sr/dokumenti/ostalo/izvestaji-o-radu/planinspekcijskog-nadzora

[19]  HRLAB (2022), Special protection of motherhood: https://www.hrlab.rs/hr-blog/novosti/posebna-zastita-materinstva

[20] ASTRA (2023), Safe Work – A Mobile Application for the Prevention of Labor Exploitation: https://astra.rs/en/labour-exploitation/

[21] KoRSE (2023) Round table on social entrepreneurship held in Novi Sad: https://solidarnaekonomija.rs/okrugli-sto-o-socijalnompreduzetnistvu-odrzan-u-novom-sadu/

[22] IDC (2024), WB Social Economy All stars compound: https://idcserbia.org/en/publikacije/western-balkans-social-economy-all-stars-compound-wises4youth/

[23] IDC (2024), Sustainability Roadmap: https://idcserbia.org/en/publikacije/sustainability-roadmap-of-social-enterprises-wises4youth/-economy-all-stars-compound-wises4youth/

[24] IDC (2024), Toolkit for social entrepreneurs: https://idcserbia.org/en/publikacije/wises4youth-toolkit-for-social-entrepreneurs/

[25] Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia (2018) Labour Act: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/employment-act-republic-serbiahtml

[26] European Commission (2023), Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

[27] United Nations Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (2022), Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Serbia: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3969915?ln=en&v=pdf

[28] RFE (2023), Serbia Bor Mine Protests Working Conditions Wages: https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-bor-mine-protests-working-conditions-wages/32221562.html

[29] Euronews Serbia (2023), After the tragedy at the school in Vračar, several educational unions announced a work stoppage for tomorrow: https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/drustvo/86384/nakon-tragedije-u-skoli-na-vracaru-viseprosvetnih-sindikata-za-sutra-najavilo-obustavu-rada/vest

[30] Blic (2023), Salaries in education are one of the key questions of the fall: The budget foresees an increase, and how much do teachers earn now?: https://www.blic.rs/biznis/moj-novcanik/povecanje-plata-u-prosveti-2023/tmrbm91

[31] N1 (2023), The union of employees in social protection again announces a protest and warning strike: https://n1info.rs/biznis/sindikat-zaposlenih-u-socijalnoj-zastiti-opet-najavljuje-protest-i-strajk-upozorenja/

[32] N1 (2023), Agreement between the Post Office and the Trade Union “Radnik”: Payment of the salary difference for October on December 15: https://n1info.rs/biznis/dogovor-poste-i-sindikata-radnik-isplata-razlike-plate-za-oktobar-15-decembra/

[33] Puls Šumadije (2023), Savetnica ministra preti sindikalcima Energetike Kragujevac da odustanu od štrajka: https://pulssumadije.com/savetnica-ministra-preti-sindikalcima-energetike-kragujevac-da-odustanu-od-strajka/

[34] USPRS (2023), Protest by educators, submitted requests to the Government of Serbia https://www.usprv.org.rs/2023/09/

[35] NSPRS (2023), Today is a warning strike in schools:  https://nsprs.org/2023/11/13/danas-je-strajk-upozorenja-u-skolama/

[36] Confederation of Autonomous Trade Unions of Serbia (2023), The Government of Serbia and the health unions have reached an agreement: https://sindikat.rs/2023/11/23/vlada-srbije-i-zdravstveni-sindikati-postigli-sporazum/

[37] Euronews (2023), Ministry of Defense: Representatives of the Military Union present malicious and political accusations: https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/drustvo/94767/ministarstvo-odbrane-predstavnici-vojnogsindikata-iznose-zlonamerne-i-politikanske-optuzbe/vest

Stambena pitanja

Serbia’s housing crisis revealed deep-rooted issues in 2023, including a shortage of affordable housing, poor urban planning, and widespread informal settlements. Economic pressures and a weak legal framework make the situation worse. This is corroborated by significant social inequalities, such as half the population living in overcrowded conditions, endangering their right to adequate housing.[1] Zakon o socijalnoj zaštiti pruža opštu podršku pojedincima i porodicama u potrebi, ali se ne bavi posebno beskućništvom ili stambenim potrebama ugroženih grupa. Beskućništvo u Srbiji je retko u fokusu javnosti, a samo nekoliko organizacija i udruženja civilnog društva se aktivno bavi ovim pitanjem osnivanjem prihvatilišta, dnevnih centara i mobilnih usluga za osnovne potrepštine.

Tačan broj beskućnika u Srbiji je teško utvrditi zbog nestandardizovane metodologije prikupljanja podataka. Zvanični podaci govore o 445 primarnih beskućnika i 17.800 sekundarnih beskućnika.[2] Crveni krst i druge organizacije procenjuju da u Srbiji živi između 5.000 i 15.000 beskućnika, ali ove cifre nisu definitivne jer postoje problemi sa registracijom i neadekvatnim definicijama. Zakon o prebivalištu i boravištu građana u Srbiji predstavlja značajnu prepreku za osobe u situaciji beskućništva, uskraćujući im pristup osnovnim pravima i socijalnoj pomoći. Istovremeno, nedovoljna zaštita od deložacije dovodi do toga da mnoge osobe završe na ulici bez ikakve podrške. Nacrt strategije socijalne zaštite za period 2019-2025. godine ima značajne nedostatke, usled neadekvatnog mapiranja problema i neefikasnih mera za rešavanje ekstremnog siromaštva i gladi.[3] Neusvajanje ove strategije do kraja 2023. godine dodatno usporava napredak.

Iskorenjivanje siromaštva

Prema podacima Republičkog zavoda za statistiku (RZS), stopa rizika od siromaštva u Srbiji smanjila se na 20% u 2022. godini, što predstavlja smanjenje od 1,2 % u odnosu na prethodnu godinu. Međutim, stopa rizika od socijalne isključenosti i dalje je visoka i iznosi 28,1%, što je smanjenje od samo 0,3 % u odnosu na prethodnu godinu. Kako navodi NSG, iako ovi podaci ukazuju na poboljšanja, mnogi ljudi i dalje žive sa niskim prihodima i socijalnom isključenošću. Kategorije koje Republički zavod za statistiku koristi za merenje siromaštva su proizvoljno postavljene i često zanemaruju specifične potrebe marginalizovanih grupa, što dovodi do potcenjivanja stvarnog obima siromaštva.

Serbia’s budget for active labour market policies has been insufficient, at just 0.1% of GDP in 2023. As a result, only 23.5% of the registered unemployed benefited from these policies in 2022, and less than 5% accessed subsidised activation measures. Consequently, many workers or people seeking employment choose to emigrate, and the working-age population decreased in 2022.[4]

The war in Ukraine has significantly worsened poverty in Serbia, impacting vulnerable families and children in particular through rising food and energy prices, according to a report by UNICEF Serbia and the Serbian Association of Economists. Serbia is one of Europe’s 10 least-equal countries in terms of income, with a Gini coefficient of 33.3 in 2021. The wealthiest 20% earn six times more than the poorest 20%. Children in Serbia are more likely to live in poverty than any other age group.[5] Stopa inflacije u 2022. godini iznosila je 11,9%, uglavnom zbog rasta cena hrane i energije, što je ozbiljno uticalo na domaćinstva sa niskim prihodima koja većinu svog prihoda troše na ove osnovne potrepštine. Troškovi života u Srbiji rastu brže od prihoda, što praktično poništava nedavna povećanja plata, pokazala je procena UNICEF-a. Iako je prosečna plata nominalno porasla za 14,6% od jula 2022. do jula 2023. godine, realno povećanje je samo 1,9% zbog inflacije.[6]

Pristup zdravstvenoj zaštiti

Postoji značajna zabrinutost u vezi sa zdravstvenim sistemom Srbije, što postavlja hitna pitanja o njegovim standardima. Sistem je rangiran na 59. mestu od 195 zemalja na Globalnom indeksu zdravstvene sigurnosti za 2021. godinu. Posebno zabrinjavajuće je to što je od 44 evropske zemlje Srbija bila na 33. mestu. Zdravstvene usluge u Srbiji su neravnomerno raspoređene, pri čemu su stanovnici ruralnih područja u posebno nepovoljnom položaju. Siromaštvo i ograničen pristup zdravstvenoj zaštiti, posebno u opštinskim ambulantama, predstavljaju značajan problem. Situacija se dodatno pogoršala zbog drastičnog pada broja zdravstvenih radnika, uzrokovanog zabranom zapošljavanja u javnom sektoru, posebno tokom pandemije COVID-19. Odlazak kvalifikovanog medicinskog osoblja u inostranstvo dodatno opterećuje preostali kadar. [7]

Projekat Srbija na dohvat ruke – Digitalna transformacija za razvoj sastoji se od različitih stubova, između ostalog i u oblasti zdravstva. Zakon o zdravstvenoj dokumentaciji i evidencijama u oblasti zdravstva, koji je na snazi od 4. novembra 2023. godine, reguliše upravljanje zdravstvenom dokumentacijom kako bi se osigurala tačnost i poverljivost podataka pacijenata. Zakonom je uveden e-karton, koji lekarima opšte prakse i pacijentima omogućava pojednostavljen pristup sveobuhvatnoj istoriji lečenja, receptima i rezultatima laboratorijskih ispitivanja i, što je još važnije, zdravstvenu zaštitu čini efikasnijom i dostupnijom.[8] Over the last year, issues with Serbia’s legal framework for organ transplantation persisted. The Equality Commissioner urged Health Minister Danica Grujičić to amend laws in order to allow organ and tissue transplants from deceased donors. These amendments were drafted but not submitted to parliament.[9]

[1] As the NGOs CK13 Youth Centre, A11 – Initiative for Economic and Social Rights, ADRA Serbia, Lice ulice, KlikAktiv – Centre for the Development of Social Policies and PIN – Psychosocial Innovation Network emphasised in their appeal in November 2022.

[2] Primary homelessness refers to people living on the streets or in places not meant for human habitation, while secondary homelessness includes those staying in temporary, unstable accommodations such as shelters or with friends and family.

[3] Centre for Democracy Foundation (2019), Analysis of the draft social protection strategy for the period 2019 to 2025: http://www.centaronline.org/userfiles/files/publikacije/FCD-Analiza-Nacrta-Strategije-socijalne-zastite-Ivan-Sekulovic.pdf

[4] European Commission (2023) Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

[5] UNICEF (2023), UNICEF calls for increasing the coverage and adequacy of financial assistance programmes, including child allowance: https://www.unicef.org/serbia/en/press-releases/unicef-calls-increasing-coverage-and-adequacy-financial-assistance-programmes

[6] Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (2023), Average salaries and wages per employee: https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-US/vesti/statisticalrelease/?p=13804&a=24&s=2403?s=2403

[7] K. Petovar (2020) Ban on Employment in the Public Sector – Consequences in the Health Care Sector for Citizens’ Protection:  http://www.centaronline.org/userfiles/files/publikacije/fcd-ksenija-petovar-zabrana-zaposljavanja-u-javnom-sektoru-posledice-u-sektoru-zdravstvena-zastita-gradjana.pdf

[8] NALED (2023), eHealth Record is coming – the Law on Health Documentation adopted: https://naled.rs/en/vest-stize-ekarton-usvojen-zakon-o-zdravstvenoj-dokumentaciji-8433

[9] Equality Commissioner (2023), Initiative for amendments to the Law on Transplantation of Human Organs and the Law on Human Cells and Tissues submitted: https://ravnopravnost.gov.rs/en/initiative-for-amendments-to-the-law-on-transplantation-of-human-organs-and-the-law-on-human-cells-and-tissues-submitted/

The CIVICUS Monitor classifies Serbia’s civic space as “Obstructed,” a status that has remained unchanged since 2019.[1] Ova klasifikacija ukazuje na to da vlasti ograničavaju građanski prostor u Srbiji kroz nadzor, uznemiravanje i javne izjave protiv civilnog društva. Na mirnim okupljanjima često se vidi preterana upotreba sile od strane policije, dok novinari rizikuju da budu napadnuti i optuženi za klevetu, što dovodi do autocenzure uprkos izvesnoj nezavisnosti medija.

Omogućavanje prostora za organizacije civilnog društva

U svom Izveštaju za Srbiju za 2023. godinu, Evropska komisija je istakla potrebu za unapređenjem saradnje između vlade i civilnog društva, kao i za većom transparentnošću finansiranja organizacija civilnog društva (OCD).[2] Uprkos implementaciji Strategije za period 2022-2030. za podršku OCD, napredak je i dalje ograničen, a verbalni napadi na ove organizacije se nastavljaju – između ostalih i od strane visokih zvaničnika –. Iako se nivo konsultacija sa civilnim društvom povećao, Komisija je uputila kritiku Srbiji što nije objavila rezultate nove strategije i što nije dala dovoljno vremena za učešće javnosti u izradi nacrta zakona.

Several serious attacks were carried out on Serbian civic associations and activists, mainly targeting advocates for human rights and tolerance and critics of the government. These attacks, often carried out by right-wing groups or public officials, undermine democracy by restricting civil society’s role in promoting transparency and human rights. Notable incidents included the vandalism of organisations like the Pride Info Centre and the Youth Initiative for Human Rights[3]  i preteće poruke[4] protiv organizacija kao što su Prajd Info centar i Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava postali su uobičajeni načini zastrašivanja, a sve to ugrožava temeljne demokratske vrednosti ograničavanjem uloge civilnog društva u promovisanju transparentnosti i ljudskih prava.[5] [6]

Građanske inicijative i BIRN otkrili su skandal u vezi sa proneverom 5 miliona evra iz javnih sredstava namenjenih medijima, civilnom društvu i omladinskim projektima. Njihova istraga je utvrdila da su sredstva preusmerena na privatne račune preko lažnih organizacija i prijava, čime su otkriveni značajni nedostaci u pravnom okviru i procesima izdvajanja sredstava.[7] [8] Serbia faced significant civic unrest and protests during the period monitored, including large “Serbia against violence” demonstrations following mass shootings. The government attempted to downplay the significance of these demonstrations, while the ruling Serbian Progressive Party held counterprotests.[9] [10] [11] Civil society groups also organised protests over issues including corruption, environmental degradation, and workers’ rights, amid increasing right-wing attacks and harassment of activists.[12] [13] [14]

Uključivanje OCD u građanski dijalog

Nacionalni konvent o Evropskoj uniji (NCEU), forum za javnu debatu, nastavlja da igra ključnu ulogu u procesu pridruživanja Srbije EU. NCEU broji više od 850 organizacija članica (uključujući OCD) koje se zalažu za reforme u cilju usklađivanja Srbije sa standardima EU. Dobio je priznanje i od Evropske komisije i od Vlade Srbije.[15] The Human Rights Committee highlighted concerns that Serbia’s Public Assembly Act might hinder the right to freedom of assembly. It recommended a review to ensure compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the Serbian government did not address this call for a review in its fourth periodic report on implementing the ICCPR, and it failed to address follow-up questions from the Human Rights Committee, raising concerns about potential rights violations.[16]

[1] CIVICUS (2023), Serbia: https://monitor.civicus.org/country/serbia/

[2] European Commission (2023), Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

[3] YIHR  (2023), YIHR Offices Attacked on Sunday: https://yihr.rs/en/napadnute-prostorije-inicijative-mladih-za-ljudska-prava/

[4] Blic (2023), Kukasti krst na tablama Građanskog pokreta “Bravo” u Novom Sadu: https://n1info.rs/vesti/kukasti-krst-na-tablama-gradjanskog-pokreta-bravo-u-novom-sadu/

[5] European Commission (2023), Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

[6] Danas (2023), Youth student action targeted with posters with Ustasha symbols in Novi Sad: https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/plakatima-sa-ustaskim-oznakama-u-novom-sadu-targetirana-omladinsko-studentska-akcija/

[7] BIRN (2023), Fake payments, fictitious lectures: How millions of euros for the vulnerable ended up in other people’s pockets: https://birn.rs/milioni-evra-izvuceni-na-javnim-konkursima-za-mlade-i-decu/

[8] Civic Initiatives (2023), Civic initiatives and BIRN reveal: Millions of abuses at competitions. Ministries of Family Care and Demography:https://www.gradjanske.org/konferencija-za-medije-milionske-zloupotrebe-na-konkursima-ministarstva-za-brigu-o-porodici-i-demografiju/

[9] Deutsche Welle (2023), The most massive protests in the recent history of Serbia: https://www.dw.com/sr/najmasovniji-protesti-u-novijoj-istoriji-srbije/a-65683865

[10] Nocars (2023), Vučić: Precisely counted, there were 9,000 people at the protest: https://nova.rs/vesti/politika/vucic-precizno-izbrojano-na-protestu-bilo-9-000-ljudi/

[11] Kudrevičius and others v. Lithuania [GC], ECtHR, App. no. 37553/05 (2015), para. 91 and Djavit An v. Turkey, ECtHR, App. no. 20652/92 (2003), para. 56: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:[%22001-158200%22]%7D

[12] N1 (2023), Citizens’ protest in Pancevo due to the ammonia spill and polluted air: https://n1info.rs/vesti/protest-gradjana-u-pancevu-zbog-izlivanja-amonijaka-i-zagadjenog-vazduha/

[13] RFE (2023), The anti-fascist cafe “Crni ovan” in Novi Sad was attacked again: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/crni-ovan-napad-kafic-novisad/32639549.html

[14] Novars (2023), Vučić violated the Criminal Code by revealing information about Professor Jovanović: Threatened sentence of one to three years in prison: https://nova.rs/vesti/politika/vucicprekrsio-krivicni-zakonik-odavanjem-podataka-o-profesoru-jovanovicu-zaprecena-kazna-odjedne-do-tri-godine-zatvora/

[15] National Convent on the European Union (2024): ”About the Convention”: https://eukonvent.org/o-nama/o-konventu/

[16] European Commission (2023), Serbia 2023 Report: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-11/SWD_2023_695_Serbia.pdf

Dostojanstveni poslovi u zelenoj tranziciji

The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) imposes a tax on imports based on their carbon emissions, presenting an opportunity for Serbia, the NSG points out.[1] Ulaganjem u dekarbonizaciju i precizno izveštavanje o emisijama gasova sa efektom staklene bašte, srpske industrije mogu da izbegnu ove poreze, da ostanu konkurentne na tržištu EU i da podstaknu rast uz unapređenje klimatskih politika Srbije.[2] Serbia’s Climate Change Act regulations, led to progress with the December 2023 publication of the Rulebook on the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) system for GHG emissions. Due to incomplete by laws, the system was not fully operational by the end of 2023, though the Ministry of Environmental Protection began training companies for a new e-GHG system to monitor and manage green house gas emissions in an electronic format .[3]Međutim, Zakon o klimatskim promenama je samo delimično usklađen sa EU sistemom trgovine emisijama (ETS), zbog čega proizvođačima električne energije u Srbiji neće biti odobrene besplatne dozvole za emisije CO2 za period 2021–2030. godine i Srbija neće imati pristup Fondu za modernizaciju. Ovo će opteretiti industriju, jer će zahtevati prelazni period i odstupanje od transponovanja ciljnog zakonodavstva koje reguliše ETS oblast u EU. CBAM zahteva od uvoznika da izveštavaju o emisijama gasova sa efektom staklene bašte: prelazni period je počeo 1. oktobra 2023. godine, a potpuna primena se očekuje 2026. godine. Privredna komora Srbije je 2023. godine organizovala obuke po sektorima kako bi pomogla kompanijama da se pripreme.

Srbiji trenutno nedostaje sistem određivanja cena ugljenika kao što je ETS u EU, ali ga mora uspostaviti do 2030. godine kako bi ispunila svoje obaveze iz Energetske zajednice i kvalifikovala se za izuzeće od CBAM-a. Ovo naglašava potrebu za brzim delovanjem Srbije kako bi izbegla kazne i ostala konkurentna na tržištu EU.[4]

Pristup energiji i energetsko siromaštvo

Srbija je postigla značajan napredak u oblasti energetike i klimatskih promena u decembru 2023. godine usvajanjem Integrisanog nacionalnog energetskog i klimatskog plana (INECP) i Izveštaja o strateškoj proceni uticaja na životnu sredinu. Ovi dokumenti utvrđuju ciljeve i mere za obnovljive izvore energije, energetsku efikasnost i smanjenje emisija gasova sa efektom staklene bašte.[5] Iste godine, Srbija je izmenila Zakon o korišćenju obnovljivih izvora energije, tako što je olakšala proceduru za aukcije za dobavljače obnovljive energije čime se podstiče proizvodnja čiste energije i obezbeđuje sigurnost sistema.[6] Kako bi smanjila emisije gasova sa efektom staklne bašte za 33,3% u odnosu na nivoe iz 1990. godine, Srbija je 2022. godine ažurirala svoj Nacionalno utvrđeni doprinos (NDC), ali bez javnih konsultacija. Takođe je podnela svoj 2. dvogodišnji ažurirani izveštaj i 3. nacionalno saopštenje UNFCCC-u, ali se Zakon o klimatskim promenama ne bavi NDC ili obavezama izveštavanja o istom.[7]

Vlada Srbije je u junu 2023. godine usvojila Strategiju niskougljeničnog razvoja za period 2023-2030. godine sa ciljem smanjenja nivoa emisija i povećanja energetske efikasnosti.[8] Strategija ima za cilj ispunjavanje međunarodnih obaveza u oblasti borbe protiv klimatskih promena i naglašava zastoje i nedostatke u Zakonu o klimatskim promenama, kao što je delimična transpozicija ETS-a EU i nepostojanje pristupa Fondu za modernizaciju, što će predstavljati izazov za industriju i zahtevati prilagođavanja.[9] [10] U decembru 2023. godine, vlada je usvojila Program prilagođavanja na izmenjene klimatske uslove za period 2023-2030, u kome se utvrđuju mere za ublažavanje uticaja klimatskih promena na ključne sektore i navodi akcioni plan za period 2024–2026.[11] The European Commission’s Serbia 2023 Report recognised this as a positive step, noting that, while implementation is still in its early stages, the Ministry of Environmental Protection has made progress by adopting eight out of 12 required by-laws.[12]

[1] Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia (2023), CBAM – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Key issues and guidelines: https://api.pks.rs/storage/assets/Brosura%20CBAM2.PDF

[2] Belgrade Open School (BOS), 2023, CBAM – Carbon tax; Whoever does not pay on the bridge will pay on the bridge, pp. 30–31: https://zazivotnusredinu.bos.rs/rs/publikacije-bos/94/165/cbam—porez-na-ugljenik_-ko-ne-plati-na-mostu-platice-na-cupriji.html

[3]Ministry of Environmental Protection (2023),The Ministry invites plant operators to training for the use of the e-GHG platform – the information system for ETS plants:  https://www.ekologija.gov.rs/saopstenja/najave/ministarstvo-poziva-operatere-postrojenja-na-obuku-za-koriscenje-e-ghg-platforme-informacionog-sistema-za-ets-postrojenja

[4] Belgrade Open School (2023), If you don’t pay at the bridge, you’ll pay at the crossing p.27: https://downloads.bos.rs/publikacije/CBAM.pdf

[5] Ministry of Mining and Energy (2023), Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan of the Republic of Serbia for the period 2030 with the projections up to 2050: https://www.ekologija.gov.rs/sites/default/files/2023-11/low_carbon_development_strategy_of_the_republic_of_serbia_for_the_period_2023-_2030_with_projections_until_2050.pdf11/low_carbon_development_strategy_of_the_republic_of_serbia_for_the_period_2023-_2030_with_projections_until_2050.pdf

[6] CEE Energy News (2023) , Serbian parliament adopts amended RES framework: https://ceenergynews.com/renewables/serbian-parliament-adopts-amended-res-framework/

[7] Koalicija27 (2023), A Green Agenda with no Agenda: Shadow Report on Chapter 27: https://www.koalicija27.org/en/shadow-reports/

[8] Ministry of Mining and Energy  (2023), The Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Low Carbon Development Strategy until 2030: https://www.ekologija.gov.rs/saopstenja/vesti/vlada-republike-srbije-usvojila-strategiju-niskougljenicnog-razvoja-do-2030-godine

[9] Balkan Green Energy News  (2023), Serbia adopts Low Carbon Development Strategy: https://balkangreenenergynews.com/serbia-adopts-low-carbon-development-strategy/

[10] Serbian Government (2019), The negotiating position of the Republic of Serbia for the Intergovernmental Conference on the Accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union for the Chapter: https://www.mei.gov.rs/srl/dokumenta/eu-dokumenta/pristupni-pregovori-sa-eu/pregovaracke-pozicije/pregovaracke-pozicije-za-poglavlje-27/

[11] Ministry of Environmental Protection  (2023), The Adaptation Program to Changed Climate Conditions with an Action Plan was adopted: https://www.ekologija.gov.rs/saopstenja/vesti/usvojen-program-prilagodjavanja-na-izmenjene-klimatske-uslove-sa-akcionim-planom

[12] The list of by-laws necessary for the implementation of the Climate Change Act is available on the website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection https://www.ekologija.gov.rs/lat/dokumenta/klimatske-promene/uredbe-i-pravilnici