Salários adequados

Positive developments include the Social and Economic Council increasing the minimum net hourly wage for 2025 to 308 RSD (Serbian dinar – about €2.60). The minimum wage fluctuated throughout 2024. Though it was increased, it did not keep up with consumer prices. [1]

The gross average wage increased by 13.8% in nominal terms and 9.1% in real terms in 2024, according to official data. The net average rose 13.9% in nominal and 9.2% in real terms.[2] There was a 13.8% gap between men’s and women’s average net monthly wage, a gap that persists across education levels.[3]

Job Security

The employment rate rose 1.4 percentage points to 51.9% in the third quarter of 2024, while unemployment decreased to 8.1%, official data show.[4] The total informal employment rate was 12.3%. It was particularly high, at 52.7%, in the agricultural sector. In non-agricultural sectors, it averaged 6.1%. Key indicators of decent work are close to zero for workers on four platforms active in Serbia – Glovo, Wolt, Mr. D and Yandex – according to the 2023 Fairwork Report.[5] Using a loophole in the Agency Employment Act, all four platforms used temporary employment agencies and employed workers with an irregular migration status that left them without guaranteed labour rights. Some of the platforms, such as Glovo and Wolt, provided bare minimum workers‘ rights, such as the minimum hourly wage and appeal mechanisms against sanctioning decisions. But none could provide evidence that they met the principle of fair representation for platform workers. Glovo was the only platform that could show it provided free safety equipment and training for its workers.

Equilíbrio entre vida profissional e pessoal

Whilst Serbia has ratified many ILO Conventions on weekly rest and paid leave, it has never ratified Convention No. 30 on hours of work (commerce and office) nor Convention No. 47 on the 40-hour work week. It withdrew from Convention No. 52 on holidays with pay and its sister Convention No. 101 for the agriculture sector. The Labour Act guarantees a 40-hour work week, which can be extended to a maximum of 48 hours through overtime. It also mandates breaks during working hours and daily and weekly rests and holidays.[6] However, employers often disregard the Labour Act’s limits and obligations, particularly those on daily and weekly working time.[7] Some employers try to circumvent their labour obligations by falsely accusing employees of faking sickness or illness. These problems are compounded by authorities’ lack of enforcement, the NSG reports.

Economia social e solidária

Regulatory advances were made in Serbia’s social and solidarity economy (SSE) throughout 2024 and early 2025, but systemic issues persist. The law on social entrepreneurship was adopted in early 2022, but it had not been  implemented in 2024. The law provides the legal foundation to recognize social enterprises as distinct actors and defines the related statutory benefits. Nevertheless, only 26 entities had been registered as social enterprises by May 2025, probably due to factors including the lack of dedicated budget and bylaws. Many others opted instead to continue under their previous legal form.[8]

To map out local SSE ecosystems, the Social Enterprise Barometer was developed under the Erasmus+-funded project Social Enterprise Barometer: Serbia. It was implemented by the Coalition for Solidarity Economy Development in partnership with regional counterparts. The barometer provides empirical data-driven insights that can lead to policy action.

The municipality of Nis is a good example of the state of the SSE in Serbia, the NSG reports. First, there was a lack of dedicated funding and capital. No earmarked public funds were available, and tailored private investment instruments were virtually non-existent. Instead, many SSE actors relied on grant financing from CSOs and foundations, which were insufficient. Secondly, support systems such as legislative frameworks and incubator structures were underdeveloped, which impeded scaling and cross-sector collaboration.

The findings of the Barometer led to policy action at the municipal level in Nis. Local stakeholders discussed the creation of a Social Entrepreneurship Development Programme based on the law on social entrepreneurship. This included suggestions on how to allocate dedicated state and municipal funds and on the creation of incubator and innovation hubs to foster cross-sector collaboration. CSOs also pointed out the need to integrate entrepreneurial education at all levels of education to cultivate social entrepreneurship. Despite this positive development, the Barometer pointed out that local governments are constrained in their support of the SSE by centralized governance structures.

Concrete measures should be introduced to strengthen the social and solidarity economy, including greater funding, financial instruments adapted to social economy actors and public procurement rules that prioritise contacts with social and solidarity economy providers.

Saúde e segurança no trabalho

The Law on Occupational Health and Safety came into force in July 2023, and employers were given until May 2025 to fully implement its provisions.[9] It seeks to guarantee the respect of occupational health and safety principles and imposes several obligations on employers. Coordinators have to follow mandatory occupational health and safety training and pass a professional exam, all during paid working hours. Employers have to refer employees in high-risk jobs to preliminary or periodic medical examinations and reassign those workers to suitable jobs if they no longer fulfil the special health requirements. The OSHA empowers labour inspectors to prohibit work on construction sites if there are (immediate) risks to workers’ health and safety.

However, the oversight capacity of the labour inspectors is severely limited by their number. The Labour Inspectorate’s 2024 Annual Report shows that only 218 labour inspectors are active in Serbia, each covering an average of 2 000 entities each year.[10] The NSG and social partners point out that the number of inspectors needs to be increased for Serbia to comply with EU occupational health and safety standards and to ensure an effective implementation of the law’s provisions.[11]

Another important piece of legislation on occupational health and safety, specifically for the protection of certain categories of workers, is the Labour Act. It contains several provisions on protection for minors, women (for maternity and parenthood) and people with disabilities or health problems. In principle, the Labour Act strictly prohibits the employment of children under 15 and only allows light work for 15–17-year-olds. However, reports such as the ILO’s July 2024 Policy Brief on Child Labour in Serbia show clear evidence of systemic non-compliance with these prohibitions.[12]

Employers have persistently failed to implement workplace adjustments that favour the inclusion of people with disabilities, according to the Council of Europe’s April 2024 Report on the European Social Charter. The European Commission’s 2024 Report on Serbia also highlights issues in passing legislation on people with disabilities and deficiencies in monitoring mechanisms.[13]

Social Dialogue

Social dialogue has barely improved in Serbia. There is little to no involvement from social partners in policy drafting. No new sectoral collective bargaining agreements have been signed, and some of the complaints brought to the ILO regarding violations of trade unions’ and workers’ rights remain unresolved. These findings were confirmed by the European Commission in its 2024 Serbia Report.[14] This report also highlights the need to adopt the new Law on the Right to Strike, as does the report by the Centre for Democracy Foundation, which calls for reforms to strengthen bipartite and tripartite social dialogue mechanisms.[15] However, both reports highlight a modest improvement, in that the Social and Economic Council could determine the minimum wage again. (See section above on “Fair working conditions – Adequate wages”.)

[1]     Social and Economic Council of the Republic of Serbia (2025), “Minimum wage”: http://www.socijalnoekonomskisavet.rs/eng/minimalna%20zarada%20eng.htm

[2]       Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia (2024), “Average salaries and wages per employee”: https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2025/HtmlE/G20251049.html

[3]     Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia (2024), “Salaries and wages of employees by activity, qualification levels and sex, September 2024”: https://publikacije.stat.gov.rs/G2025/HtmlE/G20251073.html

[4]     Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia (2024), “Labour Force Survey Q3”: https://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/vesti/statisticalrelease/?p=15384

[5] Fairwork and Public Policy Research Centre (2023), “Fairwork Serbia Ratings 2023”: https://publicpolicy.rs/publikacije/40c8cabd1c7e29e684a7a06a9cbcd8653ea629da.pdf

[6]     Employment Act (Official Gazette of RS, Nos. 24/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 75/2014, 13/2017- Constitutional Court of RS decision no. 113/2017 and 95/2018): https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/employment-act-republic-serbiahtml

[7]     M. Reljanovic (2025), “Prava radnika u procepu: Izmedju nesavesnih poslodavaca i drzave koja od toga okrece glavu”: https://www.021.rs/story/Info/Biznis-i-ekonomija/397917/Prava-radnika-u-Srbiji-U-procepu-izmedju-nesavesnih-poslodavaca-i-drzave-koja-od-toga-okrece-glavu.htm

[8]     Agency for Business Registry (2025) Data on registered social enterprises in Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia

[9] National Strategy Group, “overview of the normative framework of the OSHA, Occupational Safety and Health Act of RS (“Off. Gazette of RS”, Nos. 101/2005, 91/2015 and 113/2017 – other Act)”: http://demo.paragraf.rs/demo/combined/Old/t/t2018_03/t03_0063.htm

[10] Labour Inspectorate of the RS (2025), “Annual Report of the Labour Inspectorate of RS”: https://www.minrzs.gov.rs/sr/dokumenti/ostalo/izvestaji-o-radu/plan-inspekcijskog-nadzora

[11] Foundation Centre for Democracy (2025), “Report about position of Labour rights in the Republic of Serbia in 2024”: http://www.centaronline.org/sr/publikacija/1952/izvestaj-o-stanju-radnih-prava-u-republici-srbiji-u-2024

[12] ILO (2024), “ILO brief “Child labour in the Republic of Serbia””: https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/Serbia_Child_Labour_Policy_Brief_Web.pdf

[13]     European Commission (2024), “Serbia 2024 Report”: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3c8c2d7f-bff7-44eb-b868-414730cc5902_en?filename=Serbia%20Report%202024.pdf

[14] European Commission (2024), “Serbia 2024 Report”: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2024_en

[15]     Foundation Centre for Democracy (2025), “Report about position of Labour rights in the Republic of Serbia in 2024”: http://www.centaronline.org/sr/publikacija/1952/izvestaj-o-stanju-radnih-prava-u-republici-srbiji-u-2024

Habitação

Homelessness continues to be a problem in Serbia. It is rarely on the public agenda, only getting coverage in the media in late autumn and winter, the NSG reports. Homelessness is nevertheless a serious issue, with 20 people who sleep rough dying from cold in Belgrade over the winter months between 2024 and 2025.[1] Few resources and facilities are made available for homeless people. No national registry exists of services for the homeless, nor is there any mention of preventive measures or systemic assistance. Most public measures consist of shelters for adult and elderly homeless people. A limited number of national CSOs focus on homelessness, which fulfil important roles such as running shelters and day centres. They also provide related services, which include providing meals, hygiene and clothing, as well as psychological aid and relevant information. However, some shelters are only open in winter, leaving homeless people vulnerable to summer heatwaves.[2]

Erradicação da pobreza

Serbia’s risk-of-poverty-rate remains high, despite decreasing for several years in a row, official statistics show.[3] Nearly 20% of the population was at risk of poverty in 2023, a 0.3 percentage point decrease from 2022. The rate of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion was 27.2% in 2023, a 1.8percentage points decrease from 2022. Certain groups are significantly more at risk, such as elderly people and unemployed people.[4] The over-65s are the age group with the highest at-risk-of-poverty rate, at 23.5%. Households consisting of two adults and three or more dependent children also had a particularly high rate, at 34.7%. The highest rate of all groups was for the unemployed, of whom 50.9% were at risk of poverty.

The NSG says structural inadequacies partly explain the inability to adequately address poverty. The European Anti-Poverty Network highlights the lack of a comprehensive anti-poverty strategy.[5] The A11 Initiative points to exclusionary criteria for eligibility to social assistance programmes, which stop around half a million below the absolute poverty line from receiving support.[6] In response, Serbia has initiated targeted reforms to strengthen social policies with international assistance from organizations including the World Bank, alongside domestic initiatives such as rural welfare programs.[7]

[1] Nova.rs. (2025), “Ovo je istina o beskućnicima koji su preplavili podzemni prolaz kod Zelenjaka”: https://nova.rs/magazin/prica-se/istina-o-beskucnicima-koji-su-preplavili-prolaz-kod-zelenjaka/

[2] N1 (2024), “Siromašni moraju i leti da jedu: Beskućnici na 40 stepeni – od države cisterna s vodom, a prihvatilišta malo”: https://n1info.rs/vesti/siromasni-moraju-i-leti-da-jedu-beskucnici-na-40-stepeni-od-drzave-cisterna-s-vodom-a-prihvatilista-malo/

[3]     Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia (2023), “Poverty and Social Inequality”: httpsdecer://www.stat.gov.rs/en-us/vesti/statisticalrelease/?p=15328&a=01&s=0102?s=0102

[4]     Center for Democracy Foundation (2024), “Statement on the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty 2024”: https://sdgs4all.rs/en/2024/10/17/statement-from-the-center-for-democracy-foundation-on-the-international-day-for-the-eradication-of-poverty/

[5]     European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) (2024), “Poverty Watch Serbia 2024”: https://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/eapn-Poverty-Watch-Serbia-2024-6016.pdf

[6]     A11 Initiative (2024), “Article Randjelovic: More than half a million poor citizens of Serbia cannot rely on the government for assistance: We need a social protection strategy”: https://www.a11initiative.org/en/randelovic-more-than-half-a-million-poor-citizens-of-serbia-cannot-rely-on-the-government-for-assistance-we-need-a-social-protection-strategy/

[7]     World Bank (2025), “World Bank Approves $160 Million Loan to Support Reforms in Serbia”: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/03/06/world-bank-approves-160-million-loan-to-support-reforms-in-serbia

The CIVICUS Monitor classifies civic space in Serbia as “Obstructed”, a classification that has not changed since 2020.[4] This classification means that civic space is heavily contested by power holders. CSOs exist yet are undermined by state authorities through varies means. Citizens can protest peacefully, but excessive police force is frequently used. Non-state media face restrictions and attacks, even of a physical kind.

Enabling space for civil society

Civic space in Serbia has regressed, according to the NSG, which cites developments in the European Commission’s Serbia 2024 Report. CSOs have to operate in a difficult environment. They suffer verbal attacks. And they are hit with a large number of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs).[5]

Politicians, public authorities and the media launched verbal attacks against CSOs, activists, minority groups and trade groups throughout 2024.[6] CSOs engaged in election monitoring and advocating for democratic standards were often criticised by state officials and pro-government media.[7] The Pride Info Centre was attacked physically five times in 2024.[8] The Centre closed in September 2024 due to a lack of financial and institutional support, and it stated that none of the 24 attacks it had reported to the police had been adequately prosecuted.[9] Members of national and local authorities launched at least six SLAPPs against media outlets and journalists in 2024.[10]

Journalists and activists were also subjected to unlawful surveillance. In some cases, the police or the Serbian Intelligence Agency unlocked their phones while they were in detention using NoviSpy spyware, enabling access to their location, camera and microphone.[11] The use of this spyware was condemned by Amnesty International and Serbian NGOs.[12] The 2024 Draft Act on a Special Register of Foreign Influence Agents[13] would oblige organizations and non-profits who receive more than 50% of their funding from abroad to register as ”foreign influence agents”. These are subject to constant oversight and can face criminal and financial sanctions. They can even be banned if they “influence the public interest of Serbia” or engage in “political activities”. The draft uses broad formulations of “political activities”, “foreign funding” and “unjustified interference in the political process”, effectively allowing the government to impose arbitrary penalties.

Experts have pointed out several irregularities related to transparency and delays in public calls for funds.[14] Some funds have been awarded to organizations that do not meet the criteria stated in the public calls, such as transparency requirements, or that are unable to provide evidence of their prior activities. Other funds have been allocated by the offices of ministers to organizations with ties to parties or people in power.[15]

Prosecutors rarely act on reports of these abuses, investigations by media and CSOs have shown.[16]

Reaction to protests in the wake of the Novi Sad Railway Station tragedy highlighted several problems with the freedom of assembly. The collapse of the canopy of the Novi Sad Railway Station on 1 November 2024 killed 15 people up until 31^st May 2025. It led to protests against the government, in which protestors blockaded streets for 15 minutes (for the 15 lives). The protests were mainly led by students’ movements that besides organising blockades in universities and other public spaces across the country keeping the public attention and pressure on the government high, successfully organised massive protests that involved civil society and citizens in a transversal way.

One of the largest protests in Serbia in the 21st century took place on 22 December 2024, when thousands of people responded to the students’ call and blocked Slavija Square in Belgrade. The Archive of Public Assemblies estimated that around 100,000 people attended, whereas the MIA put their number at 28,000–29,000, whilst failing to disclose a clear methodology for their calculation. It was followed by an even bigger event, the largest protest ever on 15^th March 2025, which gathered 325,000 people.[17]As a response the government unlawfully used the sonic weapon for crowd control. On April 30, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has issued an interim measure ordering the Republic of Serbia to refrain from using sonic devices for the purpose of controlling assembled citizens.[18]

Among the students’ main demands are full disclosure of all documents related to the Novi Sad train station reconstruction project and the prosecution of those responsible for the assault on Faculty of Dramatic Arts students during the 22 November protest.[19] In fact, on 22 November, students, professors and other individuals participating in a static protest “15 Minutes for 15 Lives” and blocking the boulevard in front of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts (FDU) in New Belgrade were attacked and one student and one journalist were injured. A series of strikes organised by students followed. In general, protests, vigils and blockades took place almost daily across 400 cities and towns between November 2024 and May 2025. [20]

Though the protests were peaceful, the police often used excessive force, and they failed to prevent physical attacks on the protesters, as shown by the 22 November attacks. Tear gas was used since the first peaceful protest on 5 November, [21]and arrests were carried out in untransparent circumstances, including the fact that police performed the arrests without showing their badge nor explaining the reasons and legal grounds on which such arrests were being carried out.[22] Excessive use of batons and pepper spray was also recorded in similar protests.[23]

State officials, including the president and Prime Minister, denounced the protests as illegitimate. Some even described them as “attempts to overthrow the government by Croatian and Ukrainian spies”. The informal movement Kopaćemo (“We will dig”) published an online register of 16 student protestors, whom it called “paid student activists” and alleged were part of a scheme by foreign intelligence services. This – plus the lack of prosecution by the public prosecutor – put protesters in grave danger

[1]     Belgrade Open School (2023), “CBAM: porez na ugljenik. Ko ne plati na mostu, platiće na ćupriji”: https://zazivotnusredinu.bos.rs/rs/publikacije-bos/94/165/cbam—porez-na-ugljenik_-ko-ne-plati-na-mostu-platice-na-cupriji.html ; Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia (2023), “CBAM – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Ključna pitanja i smernice”: https://pks.rs/strana/sekcija/cbam

[2]     Young Researchers of Serbia (2023), “Poglavlje 27 u Srbiji: „Zelena agenda bez agende“”: https://rs.boell.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/k27-izvestaj-2023-en-web.pdf

[3]     European Commission (2024), “Serbia 2024 Report”: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2024_en

[4] CIVICUS (2025), “CIVICUS Monitor – Serbia”: https://monitor.civicus.org/country/serbia/

[5] European Commission (2024), “Serbia 2024 Report”: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/serbia-report-2024_en

[6]    Da se zna!, M. Srefanovic (2024), “Pokušaj zastrašivanja aktivista_kinja Udruženja Da se zna!”: https://dasezna.lgbt/pokusaj-zastrasivanja-aktivista_kinja-udruzenja-da-se-zna/ ; NUNS, I. Kragulj (2024), “Pogrešno tumačenje saopštenja policije i presuđivanje u medijima”: https://nuns.rs/pogresno-tumacenje-saopstenja-policije-i-presudjivanje-u-medijima/ ; N1 (2024), “Izjava gradonačelnika Beograda o Romima osuđena”: https://n1info.rs/english/news/belgrade-s-mayor-s-statement-on-roma-condemned/

[7]     N1 (2024), “Brnabić na nalaze CRTE odgovara napadom: Đilasova politička platforma”: https://n1info.rs/vesti/brnabic-crta-je-politicka-platforma-dragana-djilasa/ ;     N1 (2024), “CRTA reaguje na Đukanovićevu objavu: Da li je ovo pretnja?” : https://n1info.rs/vesti/crta-reaguje-na-djukanovicevu-objavu-da-li-je-ovo-pretnja/

[8]     Insajder (2025), “Video Prajd info centar napadnut 19. put: Kamere snimile incidente, počinioci nekažnjeni”: https://www.insajder.net/teme/prajd-info-centar-napadnut-19-put-kamere-snimile-incidente-pocinioci-nekaznjeni-video ;     N1. (2025), “Mladić fizički napao obezbeđenje Prajd Info Centra u Beogradu”: https://nova.rs/vesti/drustvo/mladic-fizicki-napao-obezbedjenje-prajd-info-centra-u-beogradu/ ; Radio Free Europe (2025), “Novi napadi na Prajd info centar u Beogradu”: https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/napadi-prajd-info-centar-beograd/32837734.html ; NIN (2025), “Novi napad na Prajd info centar u Beogradu, udaren zaposleni koji je stajao ispred”: https://www.nin.rs/drustvo/vesti/51008/nov-napad-na-prajd-info-centar-u-beogradu

[9]     Vreme (2025), “Zatvara se Prajd info centar: ’Održivost više nije bila moguća’”: https://vreme.com/drustvo/zatvara-se-prajd-info-centar-odrzivost-vise-nije-bila-moguca/

[10]     National Anti-SLAPP Working Group (2025), “Home (National Anti-SLAPP portal)”: https://slapp.rs/

[11]     Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2024), “Civilno društvo traži pokretanje postupaka zbog špijunaže NVO, aktivista i novinara”: https://www.bgcentar.org.rs/bgcentar/lat/press/civilno-drustvo-spijunaza/

[12]     Amnesty International (2024), “Serbia: A Digital Prison: Surveillance and the suppression of civil society in Serbia (Report No. EUR 70/8813/2024)”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur70/8813/2024/en/

[13] National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (2024), “Predlog zakona o stranim agentima”: http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/predlozi_zakona/14_saziv/011-2876_24.pdf

[14]     Civic Initiatives (2024), “Analiza Javnih konkursa za podršku projektima udruženja usmerenih na promociju, zaštitu i unapređenje rodne ravnopravnosti i sprečavanja nasilja prema ženama”: https://www.gradjanske.org/analiza-javnih-konkursa-za-podrsku-projektima-udruzenja-usmerenih-na-promociju-zastitu-i-unapredjenje-rodne-ravnopravnosti-i-sprecavanja-nasilja-prema-zenama-objavljenih-tokom-2023/

[15]     Civic Initiatives (2024), “Kako vlast troši novac građana: Na konkursima sredstva za udruženja ‘rodbine i prijatelja”: https://www.gradjanske.org/kako-vlast-trosi-novac-gradjana-na-konkursima-sredstva-za-udruzenja-rodbine-i-prijatelja/

[16]     Civic Initiatives (2024), “Javni konkursi u Srbiji: Izvlačenje novca kroz fantomska udruženja”: https://www.gradjanske.org/javni-konkursi-u-srbiji-izvlacenje-novca-kroz-fantomska-udruzenja/

[17] BBC (2025), “Serbia’s largest-ever rally sees 325,000 protest against government”: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2g8v32q30o

[18] European Court of Human Rights (2025), “Interim measure granted concerning Serbia”: https://www.echr.coe.int/w/interim-measure-granted-concerning-serbia

[19] European Western Balkans (2024), “Serbia witnesses a historically large protest as citizens demand responsibility for the Novi Sad tragedy”: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/12/23/serbia-witnesses-a-historically-large-protest-as-citizens-demand-responsibility-for-the-novi-sad-tragedy/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[20] CIVICUS Monitor – Serbia (2025), “Six months of unrest in Serbia: Calls for a snap election as protests enter “new phase””: https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/six-months-of-unrest-in-serbia-calls-for-a-snap-election-as-protests-enter-new-phase/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[21] N1 (2024), “Protesters throw red paint, stones at Novi Sad City Hall, police respond with tear gas”: https://n1info.rs/english/news/protesters-throw-red-paint-stones-at-novi-sad-city-hall-police-respond-with-teargas/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[22] CNA (2024), “Serbia: Arrests after protests over the tragedy in Novi Sad”: https://www.cna.al/english/kosova-bota/serbi-arrestime-pas-protestave-per-tragjedine-ne-novi-sad-i415935?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[23] N1 (2025), “SafeJournalists condemn police use of force in Novi Sad”: https://n1info.rs/english/news/safejournalists-condemn-police-use-of-force-in-novi-sad/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

draft