Inclusion of refugees from Ukraine

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive to provide immediate and collective protection to people fleeing the war. As of June 2023, 6.3 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded globally,[1] 4 million of whom benefit from temporary protection from the EU.[2] People covered by temporary protection benefit from residency, access to employment, social welfare, education and medical care, as well as visa-free travel within the European Union for the duration of the protection.[3] On 19 September 2023, the European Commission proposed to extend temporary protection for people fleeing Ukraine until March 2025.[4] National Strategy Groups (NSGs) reported that member states and societies were largely extremely welcoming of Ukrainian refugees, with authorities providing accommodation, employment opportunities and access to education, while civil society mobilised across Europe to welcome refugees. For example, the Bulgarian NSG reported that many Ukrainian refugees have been quickly integrated into the labour market due to the rights granted by temporary protection and the willingness of Bulgarian firms to employ them. However, the Temporary Protection Directive only covers Ukrainian citizens, their families and people who had benefited from international protection in Ukraine before the invasion. Member states were free to extend protection to groups such as long-term non-citizen residents of Ukraine. However, only a handful of states did so.[5]

Inclusion of non-Ukrainian refugees and migrants

Many NSGs were highly critical of the fact that the generous and far-reaching inclusion and protection measures afforded to Ukrainians were not extended to migrants and asylum seekers from other countries. Asylum applications rose by over 50% in 2022 compared to 2021, the result of further lifting of pandemic travel restrictions and the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) found that unlawful border practices and refusals to provide adequate assistance to asylum seekers were widespread and growing amongst almost all European states. Furthermore, problems in the appeal and review processes of asylum application procedures were also noted by ECRE. Similarly, severe shortcomings in the protection of unaccompanied minors were also detected.[6] Several NSGs reported problems with asylum procedures in their countries, especially concerning inadequate language support and the barriers to employment faced by asylum seekers.

NSGs also noted that immigration rates are rising in countries that have not traditionally been destination countries, such as Croatia. However, these rises in immigration have not been met with adequate inclusion measures, such as language courses. The few positive examples include German-language courses provided to 500,000 people in Germany in 2022 and the City of Zagreb’s action plan for the integration of newcomers. Finally, NSGs identified a trend on the part of member states to increase the securitisation of issues related to migration.

Gender equality

The European Institute for Gender Equality’s (EIGE) Gender Equality Index for 2022 registered at 68.6 points out of 100 for the European Union, representing a mere 0.6-point increase compared to 2021. The EIGE pointed to the highly damaging effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on gender equality, including year-on-year falls in female participation in education and the labour market and in women’s access to healthcare. The only significant overall increase was in the domain of power, which has the lowest absolute score of all the domains measured. It was up 2.2 points from 2021, driven mostly by greater gender equality in economic decision-making. Variation in member states’ scores is still considerable. There is a 30.5-point gap between the best-performing state (Sweden at 83.9 points) and the worst (Greece at 53.4). Although most countries made some progress in their gender equality scores between 2021 and 2022, the scores of four countries (France, Estonia, Latvia and Romania) dropped. The aftershocks of the pandemic are still being felt. They include increased unpaid care and housework, layoffs in sectors with high levels of female employment (such as hospitality) and a greater female incidence in non-standard and precarious forms of employment. This is particularly the case for at-risk groups, such as young women, migrant women, women with disabilities and women with lower levels of education. Less likely to be in stable employment, these women were often excluded from pandemic-related income-support schemes, which contributed to a stagnation of progress in reducing gendered poverty. The pandemic also contributed to a surge in gender-based violence, particularly against sexual and intimate partners, although the available data likely underrepresents and underestimates the true extent of gender-based violence in the European Union.[7] The NSGs reported considerable divergence among governments’ attitudes towards gender equality. Governments in some countries, such as Albania and North Macedonia, have been working in good faith to mainstream gender equality in their actions, although they have faced issues with implementation. Others, such as Bulgaria and Croatia, have generally ignored gender issues, adopting largely insignificant and ineffective gender equality strategies.

Inclusion of the Roma community

Many NSGs reported little to no progress in improving the conditions of Roma people in Europe. Generally, NSGs noted that Roma issues are ignored, data related to their conditions are not collected or not released, and CSOs working for Roma rights are sidelined and ignored. Data collected by the EU Fundamental Rights’ Agency (FRA) in 2021 found positive developments in tackling hate-motivated harassment and violence against Roma people. But there have been few real improvements in Roma people’s access to education, employment and basic services, and little progress has been made to tackle discrimination. Even though the proportion of Roma living in severe material deprivation fell from 62% in 2016 to 48% in 2021, 80% of Roma households and 83% of Roma children still live in poverty. Access to education has not improved since 2016: More than half of all Roma children in compulsory education study in segregated schools.[8] The European Roma Grassroots Organisations Network (ERGO) also noted that Roma have faced scapegoating, hate speech and racially motivated persecution in relation to the Covid-19 pandemic.[9] Of the countries analysed by the Social Rights Monitor 2023, only the governments of Albania and North Macedonia have taken the fight against anti-Roma prejudice at all seriously.

[1] UNHCR (2023), Ukraine Emergency: https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/ukraine-emergency

[2] Council of the European Union (2023), Infographic - Refugees from Ukraine in the EU: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/

[3] European Commission (2022), Temporary Protection: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/temporary-protection_en

[4] European Commission (2023), EU Solidarity with Ukraine: Commission proposes to extend temporary protection for people fleeing Russian aggression against Ukraine until March 2025: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4496

[5] ASILE (2022), Reasons for the Activation of the Temporary Protection Directive in 2022: A Tale of Double Standards: https://www.asileproject.eu/reasons-for-the-activation-of-the-temporary-protection-directive-in-2022-a-tale-of-double-standards/

[6] European Council on Refugees and Exiles (2023), Asylum in Europe: the situation of applicants for international protection in 2022: https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Asylum-in-2022.pdf

[7] European Institute for Gender Equality (2023), Gender Equality Index 2022: https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/publications/gender-equality-index-2022-covid-19-pandemic-and-care

[8] European Agency for Fundamental Rights (2022), Roma Survey 2021: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf

[9] European Roma Grassroots Organisations Network (2021), ERGO Newtork Snapshot of Equal Opportunities: https://ergonetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/3-Equal-Opportunities-1.pdf

Real wages

Due to the rapid rise in inflation brought about by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, real wages fell by 4% in 2022 in the EU, leading to an unprecedented decline in workers’ purchasing power. High inflation was almost entirely borne by households, as businesses passed on higher prices to consumers while making record profits, leading to an entrenchment of profit-driven inflation. Real wages fell especially fast in the Baltic countries (-7.8%), Czechia (-8.1%), Greece (-8.2%) and the Netherlands (-7%). Preliminary data from 2023 suggests that real wages in the EU have at best stagnated, with estimated real wage growth at 0.7%. Inflation has particularly hurt low-income households, as price rises have been sharp for food, energy and other essentials. Although statutory minimum wages have been raised significantly across Europe in response to rising inflation, with the average nominal increase in the EU being 12% in 2023, this has only translated into real growth of 0.6%.[1] This trend confirms the need for an assessment of the adequacy of minimum wages in EU and their adjustment on a regular basis, as proposed by the Adequate Minimum Wage Directive adopted in October 2022. Several NSGs, including those of non-EU states, raised the issue of stagnating or falling real wages, linked also to significant increases in poverty across the continent. Issues such as underemployment and precarious employment, especially among at-risk groups such as young people and people with lower levels of education, were also noted by NSGs as contributing causes to incomes that are insufficient for dignified living. NSGs also remarked on the non-compliance of employers with minimum wage legislation, especially in Serbia.

Working time and work-life balance

Nearly one-third (31%) of European workers were in “strained” jobs in 2022, meaning that the negative aspects of their working conditions outweighed the positive. According to research conducted by Eurofound, 45% of workers would like to work fewer hours, including 40% of those working a standard 35-to-40-hour work week. On the other hand, nearly half of underemployed part-time workers (working 20 or fewer hours a week) want more hours. One-third of workers work more hours than stated in their contracts, 16% report working in their free time every week to meet work demands, and 14% were regularly called into work at short notice. The gendered aspect of overwork is stark once unpaid work is taken into account: on average women work seven hours more per week than men, amounting to eight more working weeks each year.[2] NSGs reported significant problems with issues relating to overwork, including the difficulty of reconciling work and personal life, the non-payment of overtime, and non-compliance with working time legislation. The question of the gendered aspect of overwork and the division of household and care tasks was present in almost every state analysed. Finally, although several NSGs raised the idea of a four-day working week to tackle the problems of deteriorating work-life balance and unemployment, very little is being done by governments to promote the policy, except for a small trial in Spain.

EU member states transposed both the Work-Life Balance Directive and the Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions Directive. The first Directive was significant in countries such as Bulgaria and Croatia in that it introduced measures such as paternity leave and carers’ leave for the first time. Another significant positive aspect was the introduction of the right of parents and carers of children up to eight years old to request flexible working arrangements.[3] The second Directive updates the Written Statement Directive from 1991, by extending to all forms of work the obligation for employers to adequately inform employees about their working conditions. The obligation has thus been extended to include non-standard employment relationships that did not exist 30 years ago. Furthermore, the new Directive introduces sanctions for non-compliance, which were not present in the 1991 Directive.[4]

[1] Institute of Economic and Social Research (2023), WSI European Collective Bargaining Report 2022/2023: https://www.wsi.de/fpdf/HBS-008657/p_wsi_report_86e_2023.pdf

[2] Eurofound (2023), Living and Working in Europe 2022: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/en/publications/2023/living-and-working-europe-2022

[3] European Commission (2023), Work-Life Balance: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1311&langId=en

[4] European Commission (2023), Transparent and predictable working conditions: https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1313

Poverty and the cost-of-living crisis

There was an explosion of poverty across Europe in 2022 and 2023, largely due to extremely elevated inflation caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent energy crisis. Considering that the prices of essentials such as food and energy rose particularly significantly, high inflation overwhelmingly affected people at the lower end of the income distribution. The European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) highlighted the inadequacy of new and existing social protection measures in the face of rising inflation and the cost-of-living crisis. Minimum guaranteed income schemes across Europe often did not even cover basic food costs for beneficiaries. For example, the Croatian NSG noted that the guaranteed minimum benefit for a single person is one-third of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold (€132.72 a month compared to €405 a month). Furthermore, almost 9% of the EU population aged 18 to 64 were in in-work poverty in 2021, highlighting the crisis of low pay and underemployment. Poverty rates are particularly high for people living in rural areas, young people, people with children, women, and migrants.[1] NSGs reported difficult situations in all states covered. Even France, one of the richer states, the number of people requesting food aid increased 20% from 2021 to 2022.[2] However, the effectiveness of measures taken by governments varied significantly. The North Macedonian and Albanian NSGs reported that those countries’ governments have committed to expanding social protection to catch up with the European average. This has led, for example, to a 45% increase in beneficiaries of Guaranteed Minimum Assistance in North Macedonia. Similarly, the Spanish NSG noted that “social shield” measures introduced during the Covid-19 pandemic contributed to the reduction of Spain’s at-risk-of-poverty rate in 2022. On the other hand, the NSGs of Serbia, Croatia and France criticised their respective governments for the ineffectiveness of their responses to rising poverty.

Housing

Average rents have increased by 19% over the past decade, and house prices by 47% – and the house price growth has consistently outpaced rises in incomes. Because housing costs represent the highest share of household budgets for the vast majority of Europeans (an average of 32.7%), the sharp increases in housing costs have also contributed to a generalised increase in financial difficulties. Furthermore, the number of homeless people sleeping rough or in emergency accommodation each night in the EU is estimated at 700,000 – a 70% increase since 2009. Investment in public and social housing has halved since 2001, with social housing policies increasingly focussed on providing housing allowances rather than building social housing. Private investment and construction have been constrained by supply chain disruptions due to the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as rising interest rates and inflation.[3] Almost all NSGs reported highly problematic housing situations in their countries. Most concerningly, Germany’s social housing stock has halved since 2006, and there is a shortage of 1.9 million affordable apartments in its largest cities. Around 8.5 million people, or 13% of German tenants, face housing costs so high that their income net of housing costs is below subsistence level.[4] The Albanian NSG reported year-on-year increases in rents greater than 10% in every region of the country.[5] Although the Spanish NSG raised concerns over the rising costs of housing in the country, it also praised the recently passed Right to Housing Law, which allows regional governments to control rents in areas of stress on the housing market. Furthermore, the Spanish government intends to build 184,000 units of social housing.[6]

Access to healthcare

European healthcare systems have suffered from the twin impacts of austerity and Covid-19. These have had severe effects on the quality of care, leading to over a million premature deaths across EU countries in 2019, which represented two-thirds of deaths under 75. Unmet health needs across the EU remained as high in spring 2022 as in spring 2021, suggesting that the burden on healthcare systems has not lightened, despite the effective end of the Covid-19 pandemic. The most common reasons given for unmet health needs are the cost of procedures, especially in states with high out-of-pocket health expenditures, and waiting times, which have increased across almost all of Europe. Most concerningly, almost 7% of EU households, and just over 10% of Western Balkans households, experienced catastrophic health spending (defined as needing to pay 40% of household income net of subsistence to pay for healthcare).[7] Healthcare staff are also overstretched, overworked and underpaid throughout Europe. Almost half of European states face severe shortages of doctors and nurses, and the EU as a whole lost over 420,000 residential care staff from 2019 to 2020.[8] The Albanian, Bulgarian and Greek NSGs raised concerns over access to healthcare, noting the existence of “medical deserts” in Albania, extremely high out-of-pocket payments in Bulgaria and the total fragmentation of primary healthcare provision in Greece.

[1] European Anti-Poverty Network (2023), EU 2022 Poverty Watch: https://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/eapn-EAPN-Report_EU-2022-Poverty-Watch_Unequal-Times-of-Crisis-5677.pdf

[2] Ipsos (2022), Barometer of poverty Ipsos/ Secours Populaire: https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/barometre-de-la-pauvrete-ipsos-secours-populaire-57-des-francais-disent-avoir-deja-vecu-une

[3] Housing Europe (2023), The State of Housing in Europe in 2023: http://www.stateofhousing.eu/The_State_of_Housing_in_Europe_2023.pdf

[4] Stern (2023), Study: There is a shortage of 700,000 apartments in Germany: https://www.stern.de/news/studie--in-deutschland-fehlen-700-000-wohnungen-33093314.html

[5] ALTAX (2022), The apartment rental market in Tirana and the price increase in recent years: https://altax.al/en/the-apartment-rental-market-in-tirana-and-the-price-increase-in-recent-years/

[6] Official State Bulletin (2023), Right to Housing Law: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2023-12203

[7] OECD (2022), Health at a Glance: Europe 2022: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-at-a-glance-europe-2022_507433b0-en#page1

[8] Social Europe (2022), Health and social care: staff shortages critical: https://www.socialeurope.eu/health-and-social-care-staff-shortages-critical

NSGs reported differing situations regarding civic space in their respective states, with developments largely concentrated in two areas. Firstly, the involvement of civil society in public policymaking and the health of civic dialogue varied greatly from state to state. At one extreme, countries such as North Macedonia and Spain have significantly improved their structures for civic dialogue, allowing civil society organisations to engage with authorities effectively and productively in the elaboration of public policies. Both NSGs report that their respective countries’ governments take civil dialogue seriously and engage in good faith with civil society. On the other hand, the NSGs of Croatia, Greece and Serbia reported continued hostility on the part of authorities towards civil society. Both the Croatian and Serbian NSGs raised concerns regarding public funding being awarded in an opaque way to previously unknown CSOs, often with connections to the authorities. The second area remarked upon by numerous NSGs was the status of fundamental rights, especially the freedoms of association, assembly and speech. The French NSG was particularly critical of the so-called Republican Engagement Contracts, which have been used by authorities to constrain civil society organisations. Similarly, the Greek NSG raised concerns about the criminalisation of CSOs engaged in the protection of migrants’ rights, through both a new law regulating the registration of CSOs and a systematic campaign of legal harassment. The Albanian, German and Bulgarian NSGs reported attacks on and intimidation of journalists, both from official and private actors. Finally, the Albanian and Serbian NSGs made points about the freedom of peaceful assembly. In Albania, the NSG reported improvements in laws on peaceful assembly. In Serbia, the NSG denounced the government’s unjustified attempt to prohibit EuroPride in Belgrade in 2022. Overall, considering differences among all the countries, the state of civic space and the quality of civil dialogue are a matter of concern for civil society in Europe. They must therefore be monitored, protected and enhanced.  

Almost every NSG reported a significant rise in energy poverty and excessive energy costs in their respective countries. Related problems, such as large numbers of households being unable to keep their homes warm or cool, have been intensified in many states by the low energy efficiency of many buildings. Attempts to address these issues have been hindered by the lack of an official definition of energy poverty in many states, such as Croatia, Bulgaria and Serbia. In addition, these countries do not collect data on the problem and do not have any specific official actor tasked with combatting energy poverty. Countries with greater dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, namely Germany and Bulgaria, were particularly hit by rising energy prices. Governments in all countries began to introduce measures aimed at alleviating energy poverty and the sharp rises in energy prices. Some policies, such as Albania’s freeze of electricity prices and significant subsidies to households, were more effective than others. The French NSG was particularly critical of the French government’s response, which involved providing energy checks with a value far below the annual rise in energy costs. Also, the government covered part of the costs of renovations to boost the energy efficiency of homes, a measure that was accessible only to homeowners with sufficient disposable income. The German NSG criticised the German government for only giving students a lump-sum payment of €200 in March 2023 and for delaying many other support payments. More-successful measures included the  introduction of significant public transport subsidies in Germany and Spain, which led to a boom in trips taken by train and other forms of sustainable transport.

The NSGs of both Spain and Greece reported on the use of money from the Just Transition Fund to mitigate the closure of coal mines and coal-fired power plants in certain regions. The Spanish NSG was particularly positive about the involvement of social partners and civil society in Just Transition policies. The European Commission estimated that renewable sources would have to reach a 69% share of electricity generation for the Union to reach its RePowerEU goals. However, research by the International Energy Agency suggests the EU will not reach this goal, especially as Germany, Europe’s largest energy consumer, has actually increased its reliance on coal.[1] The EU’s policies and actions towards reducing its emissions have been deemed insufficient by the Climate Action Tracker to avoid an increase of more than 1.5ºC in global temperatures.[2] Outside the EU, both the Albanian and North Macedonian NSGs expressed satisfaction in their respective countries’ decarbonisation efforts, although issues such as the lack of a unified financing framework and a continued lack of green skills were also raised. On the other hand, Serbia has made little progress in moving away from coal-fired power, despite significant potential for scaling up solar and hydropower generation.

[1] IEA (2022), Is the European Union on track to meet its REPowerEU goals?: ﷟HYPERLINK "https://www.iea.org/reports/is-the-european-union-on-track-to-meet-its-repowereu-goals"https://www.iea.org/reports/is-the-european-union-on-track-to-meet-its-repowereu-goals

[2] Climate Action Tracker (2023), Countries - EU: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/